The Fireplan I did not get to fire

A pepper plantation in Batu Kawa

D Day. A typical day in 1970s

H Hr. 0600 hrs

Friendly Forces

- 3Bde

- 2 RAMD infantry battalions plus one additional Tiger Platoon from a Ranger battalion in RASCOM

In Direct Support.

- B Bty 2 Arty (6 guns)

- Brigaded mortars. 3 platoons (24 tubes)

In Support

2 Nuri

1 Allouette 

Sarawak JKR and DID departments

AO.

Sarawak Division 1. Sempadi Forest Reserve

D-45 day. 3 Bde had received A1 info that our nemesis Bong Kee Chok, the elusive top CT comd in Sarawak will RV with all his sections estimate to total 50 to 60 enemies. Also the info included several groups of Min Yeun sympathisers from Batu kawa area would attend the meeting. The RV was to be at a known ex CT camp in the Sempadi Forest Reserve on a given date. This info was one not to be complacent about. 3 Bde swung into action. A series of briefings and orders were conducted, including briefings to the State Security Committee and SB. This was the mother of all info and failure was not an option.

The attack on the CT camp was to be conducted by three tiger platoons, directly inserted into the AO by helis. Two infantry battalions were to conduct a full cordon around the CT camp. Strategic routes were ambushed and cut off with HF tasks. A fireplan to pound the CT camp was to scheduled from H – 60 to H hour. Yes, more than 200 targets over 60 minutes, spread over the 4 grid squares of the CT camp. The tiger platoons were to abseil into the camp at H hour.

The plan and orders were clear, but the preparation stage was not.

The CT camp was about 3 km in the vicinity of homesteads of pepper plantations, quite near Batu Kawa.  This ops followed the aftermath of the political backlash of the bad incident in Balai Ringgin in which we had shelled a longhouse. Hitting another homestead will be disastrous and with unimaginable consequences. We warned by the State Security Committee. We had no options but precision with our fireplan. Another main consideration was the element of surprise was key to the success of the operations. Getting Bong Kee Chock, not any Charlie..

For accuracy of the fall of shots, both for the safety of the civilians, who sometimes stayed overnights in their pondoks scattered all over the plantations and own troops, the best I could do was at least survey all the gun and mortar positions to be deployed in the Batu Kawa area. I could not register the targets.

For surprise and concealment of deployment I had to devise a plan to survey and prepare the gun positions and mortar baseplates. How to deploy 2,700 rounds of 105 mm and 84 mm into the area without any military presence and activities? My recce parties comprise my GPOs , mortar platoon comds and regimental surveyors/BDP personnel. We would dress in DID field attire, pistol strapped onto our chests, our small firearms hidden in DID Land rovers. We did our surveys using our own survey equipment spending our day with civilian plantation workers/ Min Yuens. We actually spoke to some of them explaining our task to bring irrigation into the area. Big time actors we were.

Next, how do we deploy? Guns, mortars and ammo? 2,700 rounds comprising 360 X105mm and 2,340 X 84mm to be fired over 4 maps grid squares in one hour. We commanded all the available lorries from the JKR and DID depts for our deployment. We had to unboxed all the ammo and concealed them into the lorries and started to pre-dump the ammo starting D-4 day. On D-1day we stripped the guns and mortar tubes and conducted night deployments with the JKR/ DID lorries. This was a massive deployment and logistic operation, believe me. I am proud that we did all we had to do to achieve surprise.

D-1 Day. 2200 Hours. General Hassan 3 Bde comd stomped into Bde TAC HQ. Furious, frustrated and infuriated. Abort the operation. No other explanation. He left for his tent and all of us confused. 

Abort the mission? My guns and mortars were just finishing reporting Bty ready. All infantry troops were also in the cordon positions and had reported in-positions. The three Tiger platoons were ready to take off the next morning from Kuching airport and Lundu camp. Later into the night the BM briefed us further orders. The overall plans were to be modified. The infantry assault troops were still to move in, but not into the camp but abseil into alternative sites. Cordon troops to remain in position. Fireplan not to be fired.

The modified operational plan was carried out to limited success. The enemy were in the camp, numbers unknown. We had several body counts but no Bong Kee Chock. The cordon groups were still in place for the next 10 days and had several contacts. We did not fire a single round.

Then came the real nightmare. How do we undo everything? Moving out was not a problem. We just moved out of the area with our gun towers and military vehicles, to the awe and surprise of the civilian workers/ Min Yuen. Our forward base was at Kuching 7 mile infantry camp. We brought back all the unboxed ammo and placed them on the parade square.  We had to repack them into their boxes following their batch numbers under the supervision of the ATO.

I was smarting in the officers’ mess.

Many years later we were to learn that the State Security Committee, the Director of Operation himself had personally stopped the operation. He had not briefed our comd that Bong Kee Chock had surrendered himself together with his key leaders in Sarawak. This event preceded OPS SRI AMAN.