I was there

Seri Pahlawan Gagah perkasa

I was there. I was in the same operation in which Captain Hamid Awang earned his Seri Pahlawan Gagah Perkasa (SP) medal; the highest award for bravery in Malaysia.

It was never a dull moment serving 3 Bde under General Hassan. He was so persistent and relentless to engage the enemy. One ops after another, troops in and out into the bush almost without a breather. I had seen the general's patience, emotions and empathy, straight faced and concerned each time the troops rolled out of the camp. His quietness and professionalism was legendary. General Hassan.

It was almost immediately after Ops Umpan in Lundu. We had to pursue on as to why the enemy had not taken our bait. The SB and MIO came back with another A1 intrep. A big one. The enemy were to have a big meeting in the Lundu/ Biawak forest reserve. Several independant groups totaling 30 plus CTs were getting together at a known ex-enemy camp.

3 Bde swung into action. 2 RAMD was to deploy a company immediately into selected and prepared ambush positions. Captain Hamid commanded the company. Another infantary battalion from 7 mile camp Kuching was placed on immediate stand by.

As usual we had an Alloutte tasked on a daily basis for the Bde comd and/or me. I was the Bde Comd's sidekick. I with my PRC 77 comms on my back; switching between Bde Comd Net and my Fire Orders Net. No need for signallers to be at hand. All comms were voice to voice, no messages. That was how it was with General Hassan. I salute him.

The company deployed into three ambush positions. Captain Hamid and his Company HQ group of 6 personnel, was in the rear of one of his platoons. I was to be on immediate standby to be airborne to provide arty support on contact. Thats it, we waited for the action. Which platoon will strike gold?

A couple of times I was tasked to provide confidence to the enemy that we were operating in a completely different sector, miles away. I would be airborne in low flights to be seen/ heard by the enemy. Another simple ruse. Keep the enemy happy that we were in the wrong area.

Four days, still no contact. Captain Hamid got restless and decided to move his group on their own to recce for another ambush site. It was late into the evening when Captain Hamid chanced into a group of enemy. He was not spotted and no firefight ensued.

Captain Hamid did not give contact report until the actual firefight was over. I was still airborne when I heard the contact report. Thats it. Contact and no further details. I know where the ambush positions were but not where the fire fight was. There was no call for arty support as it was supposed to. I flew into the area franticly calling Captain Hamid for contact info. No response. The platoons in the ambush positions were just as perplexed. I was still in the air when Captain Hamid called for medevac. I returned to Lundu, got off the allouette for the MO to get on board for the medevac.

Captain Hamid did not report his contact with the enemy to anyone. He did not even alert his platoons of his action. He decided to act alone with his small HQ group. He and his group had courageously crept up the enemy group. Captain Hamid achieved surprise and open up on the enemy which was a much bigger group than his asault group. His medical personnel and signaller were giving covering fire when he asaulted into the enemy group. He was soon in hand to hand battle with the enemy. He had fired his M79 grenade launcher in very close range to the enemy. The grenade was not effective as it had a safety minimum range, and it exploded a distance away. Captain Hamid had expanded all his ammo and had to use his M79 grenade launcher ala David Crockett. He was also wrestling with an enemy, bayonet in hand ala Tarzan. What a fight, but this was no movie. We had casualties and lost the medical personnel KIA. Captain Hamid had several enemies killed by his HQ group. Follow up operations later were also quite successful in getting some body counts.

Did Captain Hamid do right? Was he a hero or was he insubordination by not reporting his contact with the enemy? WHO IN HIS RIGHT SENSE WOULD CHARGE INTO AN ENEMY CAMP LARGER THAN HIS ASAULT GROUP? The Bde comd and his CO did not know what to do with him. The board of inquiry cleared Captain Hamid of his action. Courage and initiative was imperative on his part and acknowledged, above all other actions.

Captain Hamid earned his SP medal. I salute Captain Hamid. And I was there.

The monster strikes again

The joy of finishing

Last year, Rama wrote about Two Monsters and Golf. He wrote about me being one of the monsters, but with a nice nounce. A monster I am not.

I had ran last year's Standard Chartered KL Half Marathon and made it just in time, with only 2 minutes to spare, to collect my finishers medal. And Rama claimed that I was a monster.(see older post dated 19 July 2011)

I was off the road for the whole running season 2011/2012 until last weekend. I participated again in the Standard Chartered KL Half Marathon, one participant amoung 27,000 monsters.

I had put alot of efforts to regain my health and confidence. I had the courage but not the form for running. My radiation treatment was and still is zapping up my muscle intensity like no other. My hormonal treatment is zapping up my bone density like sup tulang. But I was glad that my Hypertension, Diabetes and High cholestrol were well managed under medications. I only was in poor vitality and completely out of form for the whole 12 months. I had asked my Oncologist if it was OK to run. He curtly replied "If you still can"

If I still can? This hit me like a ton of rock. If I still can.

I can. I should. I must. Otherwise I would be reduced to pulp unabated. I had started to train daily with whatever strength I could muster. My maximum heart beat rate is 160 beats per minutes,(bpm)
given my age and health conditions. My heart beat at rest hovers around 50 — 60 bpm. I had trained hard in my walks and jogs maximising to my heart beat rate occasionally. I was ready for my Marathon run in June 2012.

Me and my Angels Karen and June

Me collecting my race kit

I was on the start line for the 0600 hrs start time. As usual I was with the rear group. I was thinking hard; could I do it this time around?

Me at the start line

I was shocked that my heart was already beating very fast as I left the start line. My heart beat monitor watch read 160 bpm. And I wasn't even excited nor had any warm ups. I had reserved every ounce of strength for the 21km. I could not understand what my body was telling me. What do I do? Abort now. No way, I can do it I said to myself. I only need to rest and calm down. I walked out passed the start line. My heart beat continued to be beat fiecely. I then gave myself 10% more bpm. I will cut off my run and start to rest for a minute or two whenever my heart beat reaches 176 bpm. It was a very high risk to take; running at maximum bpm. I was doing fine. I constantly kept an eye at my watch for the whole run. My heart beat was managed with a narrow window from 160 to 175 bpm. I was on one gear mode, moving at a very controlled pace.

I finished the run at 3 hours 14 minutes, with 16 minutes to spare, to collect my medal. The monster in me did it again. I beat my last year's record of 3 hours 28 minutes.

I did it

Will I run again next year? You bet I will and I don't care if anybody calls me a monster or a coconut head for that matter.

Take care



Allen Lai

Decoy

My Bty was supporting an operation conducted by 2 RAMD in Lundu, Sarawak. We had two guns in Lundu itself. We had A1 info that the enemy was preparing to ambush the admin convoy that ran between Lundu and Biawak on the Malaysian / Indonesian border. This stretch of road had its fair share of enemy ambushes in the past years. The admin convoy basically comprise two to three 3 toners with two armour APCs as escorts..

A1 intelligence info were hard to come by. Most intelligence reports were graded F9. So whenever we get an A1 report, it would be acted upon speedily. 3 Bde comd decided to offer a bait to the enemy. Ops Umpan was a simple ruse. Reinforce the admin trucks with concealed heavy weapons. Two 3 tonners were modified to have a twin GPMGs on both sides of the vehicle. It was heavily sandbaged and carried a section of riflemen wearing bullet proof vests and NATO helmets. The truck's side canopy was also modified to drop at the pull of a lever, exposing the GPMGs. Outside ration truck, Inside twin GPMGs, M79, grenades and brave souls.

The admin schedule was to be maintained and the route between Lundu and Biawak were given Report Lines and predicted targets listed every 800 meters. Two rifle companies were place in reserve on immediate stand by mode for deployment upon enemy ambush of the admin convoy. My guns in Lundu would be preloaded and laid on to the predicted targets as the convoy progressed to Biawak. The armour comd was to report, when they had passed the Report Lines. Repeat procedure for return journeys.

My role was to ride airborne shotgun and air OP from an Allouette. I would be airborne at a comfortable distance from the route , flying in low circles like an eagle hawk. Watching and waiting to strike.

I would take off in the allouette, my guns loaded and laid, the two standby companies assembled, and the decoy moves out. We would wait for the ambush to be sprung by the enemy. Canopies drop, Twin GPNS blazing away its awesome 7.62 rounds at the enemy. One of my guns would fire, The two companies deploy immediately. I would go straight into the ambush area and adjust the fall of shot.

The above did not take place.

The enemy did not take the bait and the Bde comd called off the ops after three weeks. The Bde comd then ordered the two rifle companies to sweep clear both sides of the route. Two recently prepared ambushed sites were found, but abandoned. Why did the enemy not strike?

Good Luck, Bad Luck, Maybe.

Hello G29, This is 88........

Artillery without communication is nothing. Zilc. No firepower, no nothing. Comms are needed for passage of orders, sitreps and all the 'treps, and for keeping control of everything Artillery. The Fire Orders Net is the primary net for the artillery carrying fire orders and directing the guns so to speak. The two other nets are the Regt/Bty Command net and the Regt/Bty Admin net. All HF networks. The FO NET is always VHF for clearity and noice reduction. But VHF is dependant on line of sight signals, hence a very short range. To increase our range for communication, the BDE Signals Sqn would set up relay stations, mostly on top of hilltops for extended range. Rebro callsign is always 88.

I always request, sometimes demand for Rebro stations for all my operational activities. Some Signal Sqn comds do not always see my point for deployment of their precious resource. But I always get my way, via the Bde Comd or over beers. We unfortunately do not have the iPhone, Nokia, Motorolla and Samsung smart phones like today. No TWITTER, No Facebook, No Facetime and No Skype. No IM, MMS and SMS.
Today I use WHATAPPS and Skype for all my communication needs. I never use IM for lack of interoperability between types of hardwares.

Wouldn't it be nice if Fire orders came through today's communication setups? No need to remember the lenght of the HF arial to be used as we strung them on our diaploes. Heck, I still remember the formula to be used. Half Lampar equals to frequency over 234. Lampar or in the Queen's English Lamda is the length of the HF arial to be used. As we always have 2 primary frequencies and two spare frequencies allocated, we need to remember the formula to change the length of the arial as we change frequencies to suit the time of the day and night. Lampar is an easy word to use as we use it almost everyday; even the non Chinese personnel use Lampar!

But I am a thourough bred VHF man. I demand VHF comms for all my deployments. Call sign 88 would always be deployed, when my Regt or Bty was in town. Regts have their own Rebro signal equipment.

My Bty was operating in the Batu Kawa area just outside Kuching town. 3 Bde Signals Sqn had deployed Rebro for us on top of Gunung Sempadi, overlooking the whole AO. No VHF comms problems over 80 km.
Gunung Sempadi is the highest hill in First Division Sarawak. A TV station was being built on the hilltop. A section of LDC personnel was stationed permanently guarding the station. The Rebro section would put up with the LDC unit whenever deployed. They had a tin shed for admin; a leanto attached to the back of the main building.

3 Bde had deployed two infantry battalions for Search and Destroy Ops in Batu Kawa. My Bty was in direct support and provided HF fire missions , day and night. Occationally we would fire illumination rounds over Gunung Sempadi. A show of operational intensity so to speak. A waste of money I would say.

One night when we were firing Illumination rounds over Gunung Sempadi, 88 came in excitely over the air. Normally they were on radio silent providing their auto relay services, without fuss.

"Hello G 29, this is 88. Bomb masuk dapor over."
"G29. Bomb masuk dapur Out"
" 88 this is G 29, apa ini? Bomb masuk dapur? Jangan kacau over"
"G29, this is 88, bomb api tuan terus masuk dapur kem ini dan tidak bolih dipadam over"
" G29, gunakan Pamadam Api. Over"
" 88, tidak bolih. Dah cuba. Masih terbakar over."

The above conversation is real. What happened?

It had been a normal night illumination mission. Illumination flares open in the sky and float down to the ground providing illumination for about one miinute. Sometimes the parashute of the shell does not open. Although quite rare. We had a mulfunction that night and a flare came straight down the ground. It came through the zinc roof of the leanto, hit the rim of a 44 gal oil drum and deflected 90 degrees and shot out the zinc side wall. It continued to burn fiecely next to a stack of diesel oil drums used for the station's generators. Magnesium burns underwater and without oxygen. It could not be put out with fire extinguishers.

Luckily there were no casualties and no real damage. No Chenobyl. The diesel oil drums did not catch fire and explode. Only two big holes in the roof and side of the leanto.

I dread to know the scenarios of the What Ifs..........

Good Luck, Bad Luck, Maybe

Fireplan gone wrong

Fireplans are Gunners' bread and butter. We live in it and die for it. Fireplans are nightmares when gone awry and when the time schedules run off sync with the battleplan. Fireplans support fire and movement in a big way. Fireplans provide, covering fire, harrassing fire, suppression fire, destruction fire, deffensive fire, illumination, and smoke screens for cover. Fireplans are pretty useless if they are fired at the wrong targets, wrong timings and with indaequate weight of fire.

Fireplans are prepared and circulated by the originator to gun positions using the Fireplan Performa AB545 in my days, now "Borang Something". AB545 are executive orders to the fireunits. Simpler fireplans without precise synchronisation are normally circulated and fired from target lists.
Fireplans can go wrong, very wrong. My earlier post on my Mong Gajah troop for not firing on target Tango 13 was one fireplan gone right for the wrong reason. A Good Luck , Bad Luck, Maybe case.

My most disastrous fireplan that had gone wrong was at a longhouse near Balai Ringgin, Serian, Division 1 , Sarawak. In early1970s, I was the Battery Comd B Bty 2 Arty, in direct support of 3 Bde and RASCOM Sarawak. RHQ 2 Arty was in 7 mile Airport Camp, Kuching. My 14 months stint with 3 Bde in the 1970s was the most memorable and active operational tour in my career. We were supporting the late General Dato Hassan, " HassanPendek" for short. Pun included. B Bty was supporting an op in the Serian sector with the Infantry battalion stationed in Serian/ Balai Ringgin camps. The battalion had a mortar platoon of 6 X 81mm , commanded by the mortar sergeant. My fireplan for the ops comprise mainly HF Tgts, harrassing and impeding enemy movements, particularly at night. We had intelligence that groups of enemy move from longhouse to longhouse. My task was to cut off the routes between longhouses in the sector, whilst the infantry platoons lay in ambush positions. There were many Longhouses in this area and they were located about 800 metres to 2 km apart. This made having targets placed in between the distance of two long houses extreamly difficult and dicey. Predicted targets are out of the question with longhouses in such close proximity. My nightmares. Yes every night when my fire plan was executed.

Believe me, whilst I am Gunner and fireplans are my bread and butter, firing them are not my joyest moments. It is somewhat like running the marathon. Stressful during the run and joyest at the fininshing line. I brigade all fire units in 3 Bde and RASCOM during ops whenever the fire units are available. Brigaded fire units including infantry mortar platoons, come under my command. I will maximise and utilise all my fire resources into all my fireplans. It was a joy to have many fire units under command, but it also comes with problems like integration, interoperability, range and varying standards of training of brigaded units.

Ops Serian was planned to last for two weeks. I had deployed my four guns from Bau and Lundu and I had brigaded the batallion's mortar platoon. I had five fire units, two gun sections and three mortar sections. My fireplan include a series of targets selected labourously between longhouses, sometimes only 400 meters from the longhouses. These targets were to be fired nightly, randomly from midnight to 0600 hrs next morning.

All targets had to be registered targets and I had daily alloutte support to conduct air OPs. I would personally register the targets. I could not deligate the registrations of these tough targets to my young FOOs. I trust them, but I want to take full responsibility in this ops. Every day I would register several targets to be fired for the night. All went smoothly and well for the first several days/nights. We were firing effectively. Big sweats and big beers go together at the end of the day. Registered targets are as fired data. and noting can go wrong.

But Mr Murphy says otherwise.

I had registered the targets for the night for my mortar sections and returned to Bau for the night. Everything else was on auto mode. The fireplan was in placed. 5 RD FFE was standard, hence a section of 2 mortars would have fired 10 rounds per target. The targets were recorded, acknowledged and as fired data ordered for firing at the given timing during the silence of night. All standard procedures.

I slept early that night only to be awakened by my signaller at 0300 hrs. " Tuan ada accident, Longhouse kena tembak olih mortar"

A hive of frantic sitreps, orders and calls followed throughout the wee hours of the night. STOP ALL FIRING. It was panic station like no other. Allen Lai died several times over. I could do nothing until first light the next morning. I took the alloutte to Balai Ringgin camp only meet just about everybody who is anybody, already there. A very concerned Bde Comd, doctors, ambulances and even the local DO was there before me. They had all rushed to Balai Ringgin by road. Medevac by boats and ambulances were alread in action. Casualties came out by asault boats and local sampans. Troops had already reached the shelled longhouse. I could not describe my feelings. I was not only lost for words, I was lost for thoughts. Questions, questions, and more questions and no ready answers. Not from me, not from anybody. Reality struck in; the fireplan had gone awry. A longhouse was hit. My very fears and evevrybody's fears. I could not describe the damage caused as it was too gory, and  I am responsible. Period.

The hive of activities that followed were orderly; evacuations, reports, media and heart and mind activites went into full swing. I had the best CO ever, Lt Col Tony Morel. He quietly consoled me " It's alright Allen, we'll look into it. Check all firings until further orders. You are doing good. Only you would take on those targets. Things happen, think of it as battle collaterals. You go on to handle morale with the troops and I'll handle all the talking" Thats it, no chonek, no berserk. Everybody though highly tensed, had handled their roles well. I thank my Bde Comd for calmness in the face of political backlash. This incident was to have far reaching political / military understandings in the coming days.

I, and I alone could not breathe.

After the dust had settled, I still could not find the error. Everything was as per SOP; the registration of the target, fired datas, aiming posts, plotters and all procedures were all accurate. We could not determine what could have possibliy gone wrong. It went wrong indeed, but WHAT? What caused the rounds to hit the longhouse 400 meters away? My pride and professionalism sank to all time low. An immediate Board of Inquiry was conducted by Mejor Tan Say Loke. (Retired Colonel) He had come all the way from the school of Artillery PD to do the Inquiry. Thank you to Col Tan, he found the answer through his meticulous interviews. Good Luck, Bad Luck, Maybe.

Serian and Balai Ringgin Camps were  shared camps by the infantry and aromour units deployed in Division 1 Sarawak. The armour units more permanently. He interviewed everybody in the camp, including the armour personnel in the camp who had nothing to do with fireplan. The armour troop commander was a Sergeant and stays in the Sergeants Mess with the battalion mortar comd. They had discussed the grid reference of Balia Ringgin camp on the evening of the incident. The mortar comd had noted that the grid reference on the briefing maps in the camp' ops room was not the same as the grid reference of his mortar position. It was actually exactly 400 meters difference. The two NCO commanders had argued. The mortar comd was a very new mortar platoon comd. He had doubts about his own position. The armour troops had been in Balai Ringgin camp since day one, years ago. Surely their grid reference was good and accurate. It was logical, plain and simple. The mortar comd then did the unthinkable. he changed the grid reference of his mortar position to conform to that of the armour's. GOOD JOB he thought. He had initiative. A disaster was waiting to happen. He fired 400 meters off target that night.

As fired datas are as fired datas, are as fired datas. You cannot change anything after datas are registered AS FIRED. It was as fired, no matter what grid references at both end of the fire unit and target, right or wrong are to be used used. It is datas, point to point. Period. But smart people are smart people and Mr Murphy was right and will continue to be right all the time.

I was really sorry for all the casualties in the longhouse and their beautiful longhouse damaged. But I was not sorry for the mortar comd who was demoted and removed from his command.

I could breathe again.

Ambush at Gubir

Gubir was a hot spot. Central to most enemy activities in the 1970s -1980s. We had our fair share of deployments to Gubir. My Bty Tac HQ and two guns were at Gubir with two other guns at Mong Gajah and Sintok single gun positions. We were covering for 6 Bde which had deployed two infantry battalions in the Gubir AO. 6 Bde Tac HQ was also deployed to Gubir. This was quite a routine major ops with 6 Bde. We had come up from Sg Peatni for the past two weeks when it happened. A platoon from the Rangers Regiment was ambushed 30 km east of Gubir. Adrelinin shot up several notches. Beer cans emptied in a hurry and everybody went on to full battle alert.

Sitreps were coming in at lightning speeds. Contact reports and summaries were handed out by the Bde BM/ G3 ops. This was what we were waiting for; contact with the enemy. The enemy group in this sector had been very agressive of late. It was a show of force and their arrogance in part. Our intelligence had reviewed that there were actual conflicts and show of upmanship between the two enemy splinter groups CPM-RL AND CPM-ML located in the Betong basin. Hence the increase of enemy activities in upper Perak, Perlis and Kedah. Charlie was on their offensive phase.

6 Bde had deployed all its combat troops and resources, including the Bde's reserve troops. It was one of those major deployments in search and destroy ops. We had to match the enemy on holding our ground.

Follow up ops were the standard SOP after each contact with the enemy. Cutting off the enemy from geting back to their safe sanctuary was the key to containing the enemy on our side of the border. The artillery Bty would fire HF fire tasks along known border crossing points and also to cut off the enemy to channel them to our own troops operating in the AO. This latest contact with the enemy was way out of our gun range from Gubir or Mong Gajah, which were the nearest guns to the contact. I had to do quick deployments from Gubir to temporary forward positions in ordaer to support the activities in the contact area.

6 Bde requested for Army/Corp reserves to be deployed. The reserve battalion , 17 RAMD was to come from Johore Baru, expected ETA the following afternoon. 6 Bde resquested my arty support for the reserve battalion. The evening before the arrival of 17 RAMD, I requested for amour escort to do my recce for a temporary gun position to support the reserve battalion to be deployed west of the contact area. My request was approved and my How-1 party and I were escorted out of Gubir driving up the gravel track made for San Tai Wong (King of the Mountain) timber lorries. My recce party and armour escort comprise only our two land rovers and three APCs. Our land rovers and the APCs were at home driving up the timber lorry track in low gears. Four by fours all the way. Even the How-1 land rover with its trailer on tow could move along without getting stuck. We managed to find a temporary forward gun position and returned to Gubir before last light. I briefed the BM for the need for my guns to move forward and requested for the depolyment for the next day before the arrival of 17 RAMD. My request for ealy deployment was approved for 1000 hrs the next morning and 17 RAMD was scheduled for the armour escort in the evening earliest, or latest for first light the following morning, which wasn't unusual.

My troop and I was ready to roll out from Gubir at 0900 hrs. The BC party, CP party, two guns on tow, A-1 ammo truck with first line ammo and Q-1 truck for admin support. I had anticipated this deployment would last about at least 3 weeks. Our grouping married up with our armour escort party of four APC at the guard room. There was still time for a quick cup of coffee and roti canai at the officers mess before 1000 hrs. The G3 came to me and said "Tuan, please hold on your deployment. There may be a change of plans as 17 RAMD was arriving at about now. " And they arrived. The CO party and their first rifle company in the advance group. The rest of the battalion would arrive later in the afternoon.

The CO had just been promoted to take over the battalion and new COs are as energetic and dashing as their new pips on their shoulders. During the orientation and ops briefing the CO had insisted that his advance party of the rifle company to be deployed to their sector without further delay. The Bde Comd agreed to the CO's request for immediate deployment of his rifle company.

17 RAMD had hijacked my escort. We were to deploy later that afternoon. Battle procedures were huriedly prepared and caution was thrown into the wind. The Bde IO was tasked to lead the infantry into their sector. The armoured escorts were given a new task to escort the infantry company first, followed by us later on. Carelesness was seen as the order of the day. Rush, rush, rush. No need for OBATs, no needs for basic battle procedures, no need to test intra comms between grouping commanders in the convoy. Everything was taken for granted.

The enemy was on the run, were they?

The rifle company moved out before noon. Troops all the way from JB, without adequate rest and detailed briefings and battle preparations. The batalion was all Gungho. My guns were still hooked up and ready for the next excort out. A disaster was waiting to happen.

The enemy ambushed the convoy just minutes outside the security of the guard room. A mere kilometer and a half from the camp. A sharp bend along the San Tai Wong track that my recce party had taken the previous evening. All hell broke loose. What? the enemy dared to attack an infantry rifle company? Never in our history and unbelievable. We were all stunt and rooted to the ground. The enemy took on an infantry company with armoured escorts. The enemy ambushed us at our doorstep, under our very nose as it were, and where it was least expected.

We took heavy casualties and the Bde IO was KIA together with several riflemen and troopers. I could not respond to the call for fire support as my guns were still hooked up and ready to roll. The ammo were all loaded into A-1 and guntowers. By the time we reacted and moved back into our gun pits in Gubir camp, it was a bit too late for direct fire support. The infantry anti MT ambush drill was dragging its feet mainly due to poor battle procedures, ORBAT within the convoy and enemy's expertise in selecting their ambush site. The enemy had caught us with our pants down. The enemy had successfully withdrawn and our troops were left in a mess on the ambush site.

In looking back, the ambush site was well prepared months before. The fire trenches were well sited, prepared and camourflaged. The enemy were studying our movements in and out of Kem Gubir all these while. They chose to strike at the time of their own choosing. There was certainly an element of surprise and offensive action by the enemy. They dared to ambush an infantry company comprising 6 X 3 tonners full of soldiers and with armour escorts. Why did they not ambush my recce party the previous day? We would be sitting ducks and would be considered higher target values. ( A Bty Comd is worth several infantry comds) We wouldn't be able to do anti MT ambush to counter attack. We can't do much but to die with grace. Only God knows the answer.

Good Luck, Bad Luck, Maybe. There goes another one of my nine lives.

Allen Lai

Battery Deployments 2

A clearing for LP/single gun position

Boy have I deployed guns. Over the years during confrontation, border ops and live exercises, I had deployed guns like no other. Other than our primary mode of towed deployments I had deployed into jungle positions underslung by our Nuri helicopter, stripped and delivered by allouettes, stripped and loaded into assault boats, landed by LSTs, stripped and loaded in JKR lories for deception and more. I had fired from the beach 50 meters from the sea line in Sabah. Had to finish the fire mission before the next high tide, coming out of action in less than 12 hours. I had fired from the swamplands in Nonok, Sarawak. Gun trails strongly held up with sand bags; for only 2 rounds after that we would have to dig up the last sections of the trail. Our gun position in Fort Belum along Sg Belum, submerge in water during the wet season.I had fired from Gunung Bintang at 6020 feet high.

Old positions, new positions, I have deployed to all of them, been there, done that. For shoot and skoot fire missions in Sebatik Island, we would deploy silently by assault boats upriver from Sg Limau and skoot like hell after our fire missions, airlifted by Allouettes. The L5 Oto Melara is a fantastic and versatile gun. Only lack of imagination would hold its deployment back. Deployments in good old Asahan Range are really so bookish. Yuk!

Deploying into enemy territory can be scary. We were operating in the Malaysian Thai border and had prepared gun positions in Markers Zulu, Tango, and Xray. 15 RAMD was patrolling east of Marker Tango and was out of range from our guns. I was tasked to redeploy into their AO about 25 km away. I tasked for an air recce of the area and spotted an old abandoned and unmarked heli LP. The clearing was too small and over grown with forage. It allowed me to be winched down as I dont know how to absail, to get its fixation and check out the needs for further clearings. The next day an Engr party and I did the needful to prep the position to take in one gun and first line ammo. The old LP platform made of thin tree logs were still intact and made a good gun platform. We were on a small knoll and Tac 15 RAMD with a section of mortars on an adjacent knoll 200 meters along the same spur.

I started preparing for HF fire tasks with CO 15 RAMD as soon a one gun and ammo were airlifted into the new position. My HF plans included targets by the mortar section. We were at it for a week, when I called the mortar Sgt for a target briefing the next morning. The mortar Sgt came early for my briefing and while he waited for my orders, he decided to wander around the gun by himself.

Bang!! Musoh!!

Everybody went into their individual defence dugouts, expecting an enemy attack. None came. The mortar Sgt screemed in pain. He had stepped on an old improvised booby trap placed 6 inches from the gun's right trail. He had lost his left foot. The mortar Sgt was medevac out. We were all sorry for him; it could be anyone of us Gunners. It was all fated, so we believed. We were there for one whole week before the incident and nobody stepped on the booby trap six inches from the gun. I was the first person to be winched down to the position during my recce. The enemy could not have placed the booby trap the night before the incident as the remants of the booby trap showed evidence of rusty nails, and a rusty battery.

Good Luck, Bad Luck, Maybe. I had lost another one of my nine lives.

Allen Lai